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Abstract -  The Appellation  of Origin  system  is aimed  at reducing  consumers’ information  costs,  
assuring  a minimum  quality standard  and  wine typicity, as well as maintaining  a diversified  supply  
in order  to satisfy  consumers  tastes  heterogeneity. The effectiveness  of the  system  is menaced  by 
quantity  and  quality  uncertainty,  free  riding  phenomena,  vertical  relationships  complexity  and  
hold- up  risks.  The  long  term  risk  of  the  drop  of  the  collective  reputation  of  the  Appellation  
justifies  the economic  regulation  of the supply  by the sectorial Organizations.  Thus, it is necessary  
to evaluate  ther  role in the  construction  of the  competitive  advantage  of the  quality  wine  system.  
Then,  the  question  that  we  address  in  this  paper  is  that  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  supply 
regulation  of quantity  and  quality  in the  Italian  system  of Appellation  of Origin. We analyze  the 
current  context  of the  Italian  Appellation  of Origin  Chianti  Classico  and  the  mechanisms  of the 
supply  economic  regulation.  At first, we describe  the  structural  and  commercial  characteristics  of 
the  Appellation,  the  vertical  relationships  among  the  agents,  the  trend  of  the  most  important  
economic  indicators  of the  Appellation.  Then,  we provide  an  analysis  of the  current  mechanisms  
of the economic  regulation  of supply, from  the specific production  requirements  to the  role of the  
sectorial  organisation  in the  Appellation  quality  strategy.  Finally, we point  out  the  problems  and  
the  possible  evolutions  of the  Appellation  of Origin’s system,  in the  context  of the  Reform  of the 
CMO of wine.
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1. Introduction
3The  Italian  situation  of the  wine  sector  reflects  the  overall European  trend  of declining  
consumption  and  rising  competition  from  new  wine  producing  countries.  The  overall 
effect  of total supply  and  total demand  affects  the wine prices, with  a great  instability of 
producers’   remuneration.   Moreover,   the   internal   consumption   is   affected   by   the 
effectiveness  of  the  quality  signal  expressed  by  the  quality  wines.  It is  important  to 
preserve   the   internal   product   range,   in   order   to   meet   the   consumers’   quality 
requirements  (given  the  heterogeneity  of the  consumers’  tastes). It is also  important  to 
stren gthen  the  minimum  quality  standard,  thus  the  homogeneity   of  the  production  
systems  (in terms  of specific production  requirements  and  quality characteristics) within  
the   same   Appellations,   in   order   to  i)  increase   the   differentiation   among   different  
Appellations  and  ii) give an effective and  clear quality  signal to the  consumers.  Thus, we 
underline  the  necessity  to  define  specific  mechanisms  of  supply  control  and  quality 
policy, in order  to grant  a stabilization  of supplied  quantity  and  quality  along  the  time  
and   improve   the   quality   signal’s   effectiveness,   thus   increase   the   quality   wines’ 
competitiveness  on the domestic  and  international  markets.  
The  supply  control  in  the  wine  sector  is realized  at  two  different  levels.  At first,  the 
current  wine  Market  Organization  (Reg.EC 1493/1999)  defines  rules  governing  wine-
production   potential,   market   mechanisms,   producer   organisations   and   sectoral  
organisations,  etc. The supply  is regulated,  in terms  of quantity  and  quality, by a general 
prohibition  on new vine planting  through  2010, the distillation  programs,  the  possibility 
to  benefit  of a specific  fund  for  the  conversion  and  restructuring  vineyards,  aimed  at 
obtaining  better  quality  wines. Second,  the  sectorial  organizations  (Consorzi  di Tutela in 
Italy) – recognized  by the  Common  Market  Organization  for wine– can act into  different  
ways: i) control  the  supply  in order  to stabilize  the  supplied  quantity  and  quality  and  ii) 
promote  the  quality  wine  psr  on  the    domestic  and  international  markets.  Given  the 
demand   and   supply   uncertainty,   the   increasing   competition   on   the   international  
markets,  the  risk  of  collective  reputation  loss,  it  is necessary  to  evaluate  the  VQPRD 
strategy’s  effectiveness  and,  in particular,  the  role  of the  sectorial  organisation  in the  
construction   of   a   VQPRD   wines’   competitive   advantage   based   on   the   collective  
reputation.  
In the  first  section,  we provide  a review  of the  economic  literature,  which  provides  the  
arguments  in  favor  of   a   supply  regulation  in  the  Designation  of   Origin   sector  and  
justifies   a   supply’s   control.   In   the   second   section,   we   provide   an   analysis   of   the  
characteristics  of  the  Italian  market  and  argument  the  necessity  to  develop  specific 
mechanisms  of supply’s  control  and  quality  policy. In the  third  section,  we analyze  the 
current  situation  of the  DOCG Chianti  Classico  and  the  relative mechanisms  of quantity  
and  quality regulation.  In particular, we point  out  the positive elements  and  the limits  of 
the  supply  regulation.  We consider  the  Appellation  of Origin  Chianti  Classico  because  i) 
the  Consorzio  Chianti  Classico  is  one  of  the  28  italian  Consortium  which  have  been  
authorized  to the  control  and  quality  certification  activity  and  ii) it is representative  as 
regards  to the number  of the associated  producers.  
2. The literature  review
In the  wine  market,  a very  heterogeneous  supply  and  the  impossibility  to  observe  the  
product  quality  before  purchase,  imply  an  important  asymmetric  information  between  
the  producers  and  the consumers  and, therefore,  strong  promotional  and  research  costs  
(Nelson,  1970,  Darby  e Karny,  1973).  The  risk  of  inefficiency  in  the  quality  signals  – 
which  do  not  fulfil  consumers  expectations  on  quality  and  typicity  – is  that  of  the  
reduction  of  the  average  quality  level  supplied  in  the  market  implying  a  long  term  
demand  drop  (Akerlof, 1970). In this  context,  the  objective  of the  Appellation  of Origin 
system  is to i) maintain  a diversified  supply  and  ii) reduce  consumers’ information  costs. 
The  Appellation  of  Origin  system  has  important  consequences  on  the  “characteristics  
space”   (Lancaster,   1966)   providing  i)  an   increase   in   the  inter- appellation  quality 
differentiation  and  ii)  a decrease  in  the  intra- appellation  one,  in  order  to  assure  the 
4typicity  of  the  wine  belonging  to  the  same  Appellation  of  Origin.  The  quality  wines 
represent  a good  example  of resolution  of the  problem  of asymmetric  information.  The 
quality is identified  from  i) an Appellation  of Origin and  ii) an individual  brand  (Laporte, 
2001).
In  general,  the  Appellation  of  Origin  System  is  effective  if  i)  it  provides  the  quality 
differentiation  (without  proliferation  in the number  of Appellation), ii) ii) it maintains  the 
quality  range  within  every  Appellation  and  iii) it provides  a remuneration  which  meets  
both  producers  and  consumers  requirements  (Giraud- Héraud,  Soler, Steinmetz,  Tanguy, 
1998). The  respect  of these  effectiveness  conditions  is menaced  by  i) the  quantity  and  
the  quality  uncertainty  (agricultural  revenues  variability, problems  in long  term  quality  
investments),  ii)  the  free   riding  phenomenon   (Holmström,   1982),  iii)  the   vertical 
relationships’ complexity  and  the  hold – up risk  (Williamson,  1985). The risk  is that  of a 
drop   of   the   Appellation’s   collective   reputation   and   consumers’   satisfaction.   The 
stabilization   of   the   supply,   relatively   to   the   demand   (thus   the   stabilization   of   the 
producers’  remuneration)  is important  to  grant  the  maintain  of the  quality  level in the  
long  term,  expecially  in  the  case  of  experience  goods. This  aspect  is  analyzed  is  the  
models  of Shapiro  (1982, 1983). The author  consider  a model  of perfect  competition  and  
imperfect  information,  in which  the  producers’ reputation  results  from  the  consumers’  
expected  quality,   and  show   how   the   premium   price  (i.e.  the   return  on  investments  
concerning  the  reputation  initial  construction)  is a necessary  condition  to  avoid  short-
term  opportunist  behaviours.  In fact,  in the  absence  of  a premium  price  for  the  high 
quality  good,  the  firm  are  incentivated  to develop  the  fly- by- night  strategy  of reducing  
the  quality level (instead  of the  faithful strategy  of maintainig  the  quality level) and  take  
advantage  of the products’ reputation  (Klein and  Leffler, 1981). 
  The   risks   associated   to   the   remuneration   uncertainty   can   justify   the   economic  
regulation  of the system  by the sectorial Organizations,  in order  to i) reduce  the quantity  
and  quality  uncertainty  and  ii)  develop  long  term  contractual  relationships  between  
agents   and   effective   informative   systems.   A   wide   number   of   papers   analyze   the  
arguments  in  favor  of  a supply  regulation  in  the  Designation  of  Origin  sector,  from  
different  economic  theory’s  perpectives.  Bovet  and  Chappuis  (2001) analyze  the  role  of 
the   Interprofessional   Organizations   in   the   case   of   the   PDO  Gruyère.  At   first,   it   is 
important  to  adapt  the  supply  to  the  demand,  in  order  to  stabilize  the  producers’ 
remuneration  (and  cover  the  quality  costs).  Otherwise,  the  quality  maintainance  in the  
long  term  can  be compromised.  In fact,  some  producers  can  be incentivated  to  reduce  
the   supplied   quality   and   take   advantage   of   the   collective   reputation.   Secondly,   a 
reference  intermediate  price could  be useful  to assure  the producers’ remuneration,  give 
a clear  expected  quality  signal  and  strengthen  the  producers’  negotiation  power.  The 
authors  demonstrate  that  a reference  intermediate  price  does  not  necessarily  have  a 
negative  impact  on  the  final  price.  Moreover,  they  show  the  negative  effects  of  the  
vertical  integration,  in  the  specific  case  of  Gruyère  (i.e.  the  standardization  and  the 
decrease  in  the  number  of  producers,  thus  a decrease  in  the  inter- brand   and  intra-
brand   differentiation).   Réviron,   Chappuis   and   Barjolle   (2003)   show   that   the  
Interprofessional  Organization,  in the specific case of Gruyère, can i) assure  the maintain  
of  a product  differentiation,  ii)  define  specific  production  requirements,  iii)  develop  a 
marketing   strategy   for   the   collective   brand   and   increase   its   notoriety,   in   order   to 
stabilize  the  volumes  and  the  prices  in  the  long  term,  iv)  reduce  the  informational  
asymmetries  and  v) reduce  the  uncertainty  in quality thanks  to a product’s  certification. 
Raynaud  and  Valceschini  (1997) develop  some  arguments  concerning  the  necessity  of a 
control  organization,  in the  specific case  of Label Rouge. The use  of the  collective brand  
and   the   common   production   requirements   imply   a   strong   interaction   among   the  
economic  agents’  decisions,  thus  a  problem  of  negative  esternality  and  opportunist  
behaviours  arise.  Marette,  Crespi  and  Schiavina  (1999)  consider  an  adverse  selection  
framework   using   cartel   theory   with   Cournot   competition,   where   a   third- party 
certification  may  provide  information  about  product  quality  for  imperfectly  informed  
buyers.  Individual  sellers  can  choose  whether  or not  they  wish  to  certify  the  quality  of 
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and/or  collude  in quantities.  The  authors  show  that  a cartel  in which  the  high- quality 
sellers  share  the  certification  cost  and  collude  in quantities  emerges.  Moreover,  given  a 
high   cost   of   labelling,   a   cartel   of   high   quality   sellers   can   improve   overall   welfare.  
Arnaud,   Giraud- Héraud,   Mathurin   (1999)   analyze   the   conditions   at   which   the 
monopolist’s  quality  policy is optimal  for consumers  in a context  such  that  there  exists  
an   inverse   relation   between   quantity   and   quality.   They   show   how,   at   well   defined  
conditions,  the gains  associated  to a quality improvement  can compensate  for the losses  
associated  to an increase  in prices. 
Let us condiser  the  specific characteristics  of the  wine sector.  A quantity  restriction  can 
have a positive impact  of the supplied  quality (Giraud- Héraud,  Soler, Steinmetz,  Tanguy, 
1998). The authors  analyze  the  reasons  why the  possible  negative  effects  of a supply’s 
control   are   quite   limited.   At   first,   the   level   of   competition   on   the   market   is   high 
(competition   among   different   Designations,   competition   between   Designations   and  
brands,  competition  from  the substitutes). Moreover, the international  competition  has  a 
strong  impact  on  the  prices.  Secondly,  the  strong  negotiation  power  of  the  retailers  
avoids  the  risk  of monopolization  by the  producers  in some  specific  market  segments.  
Finally, in spite  of the  quantity  and  quality regulation’s  possibilities, the  producers  have 
a continuous  trade- off between  the Designation  of Origin and  the brand,  thus  they have 
the   flexibility   to   produce   and   sell   outside   the   Designation   of   Origin   and   they   are 
constantly   menaced   by   potential   entrants.   Nevertheless,   any   form   of   coordination  
among   producers   is   legitimized   if   the   market   is   characterized   by   a   high   level   of 
competition  and  if it is not  aimed  at creating  long term  entry  barriers  and  eliminate  the  
potential  competition.
3. A delicate demand  – supply  equilibrium
The  Italian  situation  reflects  the  overall  European  trend  of declining  consumption  and  
rising   competition   from   new   wine   producing   countries.   Why   does   Italian   wine  
consumption  decrease?  From  1961  to  2004,  the  per- capita  wine’s consumption  in Italy 
declines   more   than   half   (-54%)1.   Fourty   years   ago,   it   was   over   100   liters.   Wine 
consumption   in   2004   fell   below   50   liters   for   the   first   time.   During   the   90’s,   the  
decreasing   wine   consumption   was,   at   least   partially,   offset   by   a   growth   in   beer 
consumption.  In fact, this  latter  increases  from  6.1 liters  in 1961  to 29,4  liters  in 2004.  
Moreover,   in   the   most   recent   years   Italian   consumers   have   exhibited   an   increasing  
preference  for  soft  drinks  (+31%) and  mineral  water,  this  latter  increasing  from  131.7  
liters  in  1996  to  178  liters  in  2004 2. The  retail  price  is an  important  factor  affecting  
consumers’  behaviour.  In particular,  the  strong  increase  in retail prices  of quality  wines  
(expecially   concerning   the   traditional   retailer   and   wine   shops),   together   with   the 
decrease   in   the   consumers’   purchase   power,   has   encouraged   many   traditional  
consumers  to  either  buy  cheaper  table  wines  or  switch  beverages.  According  to  the 
ISMEA’s survey concerning  the domestic  consumption,  in 2004  the quality wine domestic  
purchase  in  volume  average  5% more  than  in  2000,  while  the  quality  wine  domestic  
purchase  in value  average  22 percent  more  than  in 2000. The price of quality  wines  has  
increased  5.2  percent  each  year  on  average.  In 2004,  quality  wine  prices  average  6.6% 
more  than  in 2003,  while  the  table  wines’ prices  are  0.1% higher  than  in the  previous  
year. Moreover,  wines  bought  for  home  consumption  by families  are  purchased  mainly 
at  supermarkets  (with  a market  share  rising  from  58% in  2000  to  68% in  2004).  The 
market  share  of  traditional  retailer  and  wine  shops  has  declined  from  10% to  6%. An 
important  volume  is purchased  in the restaurants  (2.979.219  hl in 2005, i.e. 940.725.168  
euros).  The  restaurants’  share  in 2005  is 4.3% lower  than  in 2004,  in terms  of volume  
1 Sources:  Global Wine Production, Consumption  and  Trade, 1961  to 1999, Anderson  and  
Norman,  Centre for International Economic studies Adelaide University  and  USDA reports  
(1996- 2004).
2 Sources: USDA reports (1996- 2004) and Assobirra  Reports (2001- 2005).
6and  value, as  a result  of the  strong  increase  in prices  in this  channel.  Moreover,  ISMEA 
analyzes  the  «euro  effect»  and  shows  that,  for  example,  the  price  of  the  red  wine  
DOC/DOCG has  increased  17% percent  in the  last  two  years  and  the  price  of the  rose  
wine in 2002  averaged  30.6% higher  than  in 2001.
If we analyze  the  decline  in wine consumption  according  to the  type  of wine (Fig.1), the 
role of the  Quality wines  in Italy emerges.  In fact, the  table  wines’ consumption  declines  
(-56%  from   1980/81   to   2003/04),   while   the   Quality   wines’   consumption   increases  
(+80%). Moreover, the  Quality wines  (DOC/DOCG and  IGT) represent  an increasing  share  
of  the  Italian  production  (+172% from  1980/81  to  2004/05).  In 2004/05  the  quality  
wine’s share  of the wine production  rises  to 29.1%. In the same  year, the table wine share  
of  the  total  production  is  66%,  i.e.  24  percent  lower  than  in  1980/81.  According  to 
ISMEA, the  DOC/DOCG wines’ share  of the  total  production  is 30 percent  in 2005. Thus, 
i) the  quality  wines’ share  of the  total  production  increases  and  ii) the  consumption  of 
quality wines  increases.  If we take into  account  the total supply  (internal  production  and  
imports)  and  the  total  consumption  (domenstic  consumption  and  exports),  i.e.  if we 
analyze  the  total  wine  stocks,  an  increasing  trend  emerges  (+  40% from  1993/94  to 
2002/03) 3. The increase  in the  total  stocks  reflects  the  overall effect  of the  total  supply  
and  the total consumption,  thus  to take  into  account  the competitiveness  of the wine on 
the  international  and  internal  market.  In particular  i)  the  consumption  and  the  export  
decrease  (in 2002/03,  consumption  and  export  are  18 and  7 percent  lower  respectively 
than  in  1993/04)  and  ii)  the  imports  increase  (+386%). Moreover,  it  is  important  to 
distinguish  table  and  quality  wines.  Table wines  reflects  more  or less  the  total  trend,  in 
particular  the  stock  increases  (+42%) as  a result  of declining  consumption  and  export  
(-28% and  - 11% respectively) and  increasing  imports  (+585%). The production  decreases  
(-36%) – as  the  total  wine  production  (-28%) – but  not  enough  to  compensate  for  the  
overall   effect   of   increasing   stocks.The   DOC   and   DOCG   wines’   stocks   have   a   great  
increasing  trend,  which  can  be explained  as following. Although  from  1993  to 2003  the  
export  and  the  consumption  increase  in  volume  (+21% and  +31% respectively),  this  
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3 Source: Ismea.
7Fig. 1: wine  consumption  in Italy (1980/81- 2003/04,  .000  hl). Source: EU agricultural 
statistics.
The overall effect  of total supply  and  total demand  affects  the  wine prices. In particular, 
according  to the USDA Report  (2006), the growth  of the unsold  stocks  affects  the grower  
prices.
One of the  elements  which  affects  the  internal  consumption  is the  effectiveness  of the 
quality  signal  expressed  by the  quality  wine. Currently, in Italy there  are 311  DOC wines  
and  32  DOCG wines.  The  Italian  Appellations  of  Origin  are  very  small,  in  terms  of 
volume.  In fact  the  73% of the  DOC/DOCG represents  the  10% of the  total  DOC/DOCG 
wines’ production.  The  same  fragmentation  characterizes  the  production  at  a regional  
level.  In  fact,  the  85% of  the  DOC/DOCG  represents  less  than  10% of  the  respective  
regional  production.  The raising  number  of DOC/DOCG wines  can affect  the consumers’ 
perception   of   the   quality   and   increase   the   informational   asymmetries   between   the  
production   system   and   the   final   market.   Moreover,   the   61   percent   of   the   Italian  
Appellations  has  more  than  two  «under- Appellations»  (for example,  the  DOCG Chianti  
can be distinguished  in Chianti Colli Senesi, Chianti Colli Fiorentini, Chianti Montespertoli, 
ecc.). The  18  percent  of this  61  percent,  has  more  than  ten  «under- Appellations».  The 
heterogeneity   of   the   internal   product   range   (vertical   product   differentiation)   is 
important  in order  to meet  the consumers’ quality requirements  (given the heterogeneity  
of   the   consumers’   tastes).   Nevertheless,   it   is   also   important   to  strengthen   the 
homogeneity  of the  production’s  systems  (in terms  of specific production  requirements  
and  quality  characteristics)  within  the  same  Appellations,  in  order  to  i)  increase  the 
differentiation  among  different  Appellations  and  ii)  give an  effective  and  clear  quality 
signal  to  the  consumers.   The  necessity  to  strengthen  the  minimum  quality  standard,  
which  is granted  by  the  quality  wines  psr,  is confirmed  by  the  raising  importance  of 
quality  in consumers’  attitudes  towards  the  wine  consumption.  In 2003,  the  67 percent  
of the  Italian  wine  consumers  consume  wine  each  day, while  the  33  percent  consumes  
wine  occasionally.  The  75  percent  of  these  occasional  consumers  is  defined  «wine-
passionate » consumers,  which  also  have  a «wine- culture ». As in France  (INRA-ONIVINS 
survey  2005) and  in Spain, the  number  of occasional  wine consumers,  which  prefer  the 
quality rather  than  the quantity  is increasing. 
Thus,  we underline  the  necessity  to i) increase  the  quality  wine  competitiveness  on  the  
domestic  and  international  markets  (so as to increase  export  in volume  and  value), and  
define  ii)  specific  mechanisms  of supply’s  control  and  iii)  a quality  policy, in order  to 
grant  a stabilization  of supplied  quantity  and  quality along the time. 
The   current   wine   Market   Organization   (Reg.EC  1493/1999)  defines  rules   governing  
wine- production  potential,  market  mechanisms,  producer  organisations  and  sectoral  
organisations,   oenological   practices   and   processes,   description,   designation,  
presentation  and  protection,  quality  wine psr  (vqprd ), and  trade  with  third  countries.  At 
first,  it calls  for  a general  prohibition  on  new  vine planting  through  2010.  At the  same  
time, it provides  a special fund  for the conversion  and  restructuring  vineyards,  aimed  at 
obtaining  better  quality wines. In Italy, in the  period  2000- 2004, the  expenditure  for the  
conversion  and  the restructuring  of vineyards  has  averaged  30% of the total expenditure  
for  the  wine  sector.  Moreover,  the  wine  Market  Organization  provides  two  distillation  
programs,  i) optional  distillation,  which  is  automatically  initiated  at  the  beginning  of 
each  marketing  year,  and  ii) crisis  distillation,  which  aims  at  supporting  the  market  in 
the  event  prices  for  a certain  type  of  wine  or  in  a delimited  product  region  show  a 
significant  decline  within  a certain  period  of time  (art.27- 33). In 2001/02  the  total  wine 
distillation   is   63   percent   higher   than   in   1999/00.   In   the   period   2000- 2004,   the 
expenditure  for  the  distillation  has  averaged  20% of the  total  expenditure  for  the  wine 
sector.  The  wine  Market  Organization  recognises  the  “Producer  Organisations”  (art.39) 
and  recognises  that  producer  Member  States,  particularly  in  implementing  decisions  
taken  by  sectoral  organisations,  may  lay down  marketing  rules  to  regulate  supply  on 
8first  marketing,  provided  that  such  rules  relate  to  the  retention  and/or  gradual  release  
of produce,  in order  to  improve  the  operation  of the  market  in quality  wines  psr  and  
table  wines  described  by  means  of  a  geographical  indication.  These  rules  must  not  
include  any other  concerted  practice  such  as i) price fixing, even  for guidance  or by way 
of recommendation,  ii) rendering  unavailable  an excessive proportion  of the vintage  that  
would  normally be available and, in general, any abnormal  operation  to curtail supply  or 
iii)  refusing   to   issue   the   national   and/or   Community   attestations   needed   for   the  
circulation  and  marketing  of wine products  where  such  marketing  is in accordance  with  
those  rules. Thus, the art.41  is a compromise  between  i) the Community  law, in terms  of 
free movement  (Articles 28 to 31 of the Treaty), and  competition  (Articles  81 to 86 of the  
Treaty), and  ii) the european  quality policy as regards  to the quality wines  psr. 
Thus,  the  sectorial  organisations  can  act  into  different  ways:  i) control  the  supply  in 
order  to stabilize  the  supplied  quantity  and  quality  and  ii) promote  the  quality  wine psr  
on  the    domestic  and  international  markets.  Given  the  increasing  competition  on  the 
international  markets  – expecially coming  from  the “New World” wines, which are mainly 
based  on  a standardization  strategy  – it is necessary  to  evaluate  the  VQPRD strategy’s 
effectiveness   and,   in   particular,   the   role   of   the   sectorial   organisation   (Consorzio   di 
Tutelai  in Italy) in the  construction  of a VQPRD wines’ competitive  advantage  based  on 
the  collective  reputation.  In the  next  section,  we analyze  the  mechanisms  implemented  
by the sectorial organisations.  
4. The economic  regulation  of quantity  and quality: the case  of 
the Chianti Classico  DOCG
4.1.An analysis  of the current situation
The  geographical  production’s  area   of   Chianti  is   about  70.000   hectares,   with   9.000  
hectares  of vineyard.  The surface  of Chianti  Classico  is about  7.000  hectares  in the  last  
two   years,   with   1.150   registered   vine   growers.   The   Chianti   Classico   production  
represents  the  17 percent  of the  production  of quality  wines  psr  of the  Tuscany  Region 
and  about  3% of the  Italian  production  of quality  wines  psr.  In 2004,  the  production  is 
270.852  hl. The vine growers  are very small, thus  the 27 percent  of them  has  less  than  1 
hectare  of surface. Moreover,  the  4 percent  of the  total  wine production  is produced  by 
the  40% of the firms.  The total sales  are 219.951  hl in 2004. About  the  40 percent  of the  
total  sales  concerns  the  domestic  market.  The  principal  foreing  market  is  U.S. (29%), 
followed  by Germany  (23%), Switzerland  (12%), U.K. (12%), Netherlands,  Belgium, Austria, 
France,  Japan  and  Canada  (24% in total). The  most  important  distribution  channel,  in 
terms   of   volume,   in   the   ho.re.ca.   (38%),   followed   by   the   direct   sale   (37%),   the  
supermarkets  (17%) and  the  wine  shops  (8%). According  to  ACNielsen,  the  12,38% of 
Chianti Classico wines  is sold  in the restaurant  channel  in 2004, in terms  of volume. This  
percentage  represents  about  the  38% of the  total  sales’ value. In 2005, the  percentage  of 
sailes  in this  channel  is 8 percent  lower than  in 2004, in terms  of volume  but  only 0.32% 
lower in terms  of value. These  data  confirm  the important  increase  in retail prices  in the  
last years, expecially in the ho.re.ca. channel.
Let us  now  consider  the  vertical  relationships  along  the  supply  chain  and  the  types  of 
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Fig. 2: the supply  chain of the DOCG Chianti Classico  (2003- 2005).
In general,  the  vertical  relationships  among  the  different  economic  agents  can  be quite  
complex.   In   particular,   the   vertical   relationship   between   the   vine   grower   and   the 
industry  can  be  i) a supplier- customer  relationship,  such  that  the  vine  grower  sells  to 
the  industry  the  grape  or the  wine,  ii) a cooperation  relationship  (promotion  activity) or 
iii) a competitive relationship,  such  that  vine grower  and  industry  are competitors  on the  
final  market.  Thus,  the  vine  grower  has  the  trade- off  between  the  vertical  integration  
and  the  development  of  a customer- supplier  relationships  with  the  industry  partner.  
The  possibility  to  differentiate  the  vertical  relationships  is important  to  assure  a high  
level  of  competition  on  the  market,  but  it  can  be  also  produce  strategic  behaviours,  
which  affect  the  product  range  supply  (breaking  risk)  and  the  maintain  of a constant  
quality  level  of  the  Appellation.  In  particular,  the  absence  of  a  vertical  relationship  
control  and  organization  can  imply  a risk  of i) increasing  price  on  the  final market  as a 
result  of the  intermediate  stages  development  (Spengler,  1950) and  ii) the  reduction  of 
the   specific   long- term   quality   investments   (vineyard,   machines,   collective   brand’s  
promotion,  ecc.)  as   a   result  of  the   expected   loss  in   the  case   of   a   breaking   in   the  
relationship.  As shown  in Fig.2, in the  specific case  of the  Chianti  Classico  DOCG, about  
46  percent  of the  sales  is realized  by the  vertically integrated  vine growers.  The wine’s 
intermediate  market  represents  25% of the total transactions.  The economic  agents  are i) 
the  vertical  integrated  vine grower,  which  produce  the  grape  and  the  wine  and  directly  
bottle  and  commercialize  the  wine  on  the  final  market  (46% of the  total  sales),  ii)  the 
industry,  which  mainly buyes  the  wine from  the  vine growers,  bottle  it and  sell it on the  
final  market,  but  also  realizes  vertical  integration  up- stream  and  often  becomes  vine 
grower  itself (37% of the  total  sales) and  iii) the  cooperatives,  which  buy the  grape  from  
the  associated  producers  and  produce,  bottle  and  sell the  wine on the final market  (17% 
of the total sales).
The vertical relationship  is not  controlled  or organized.  The transaction  is mainly based  
on informal  agreements.  Contracts  are rarely defined  before the  vintage  and  there  is not  
any  form  of  vertical  relationship  such  that  the  industry  can  define  and  control  the 
quality   characteristics   of   the   up- stream   production   and   the   supplied   quantity. 
Nevertheless,  this  type  of contract  could  be useful  to  i) grant  to  the  industry  a supply  
characterized  by a constant  level of quality,  ii) regulate  and  control  the  quantity’s flows 
on the  intermediate  market,  iii) stabilize  the  intermediate  price,  i.e. the  remuneration  of 
the  quality  effort  up- stream  and  the  production  cost  of the  industry.  In other  words,  
this  means  a maintain  of  the  quality  investments  up- stream,  i.e.  of  the  Appellation’s 
collective  reputation  and  the  marketing  and  promotional  investments  down- stream,  as 
well as the  construction  of industrial  brands  with  a strong  notoriety, which  can  produce  
10a  positive  feedback  on  the  collective  reputation.  In  addition,  the  uncertainty  of  the 
supply,  in terms  of quantity  and  quality,  i) implies  a great  variability  of the  agricultural  
revenues  and  affects  the  minimum  revenue  level,  which  is  a  necessary  condition  to 
provide  long- term  quality  investments  and  maintain  the  collective  brand  reputation,  ii) 
creates  a product  flow instability, thus  the  incentive  to eliminated  some  quality segment  
(also that  of the  Appellation) and  iii) increases  the  risk  of opportunism  by the  economic  
agents. 
The  demand  – supply  variability  is characterized  by cycles  (which  last  about  5 years), 
thus  by  the  alternation  of  periods  characterized  by  surplus  or  scarcity.  The  strong  
scarsity  from  1984  to 1987  (with  a peak  in 1985) is followed  by a light  supply  surplus  
from  1987  to 1992  (Table 1). Then,  we have  a scarcity  cycle from  1992  to 1997  (with  a 
peak  in  1995)  and  a  strong  surplus  until  the  vintage  years  2000- 2001.  The  peak  of 
scarcity  in  1995  is a result  of  a great  sales’ increase.  In that  period,  the  consumers’  
quality  expectations  had  raised  as a consequence  of the  creation  of the  Chianti  Classico  
DOCG   as   an   independent   Appellation   (and   nomore   an   «under- Appellation»   of   the  
Chianti  wines.  The scarcity  period  beginning  in 2000  ends  in the  campaing  2003/2004.  
In the  last  years,  we see  a strong  surplus  of the  supply  relatively  to  the  demand  and  a 
consequent  strong  descrease  in  the  intermediate  price.  In the  considered  period,  the  
sales  have  an increasing  trend.  The ratio  supply/demand  averages  1, thus  the  supply  is 
quite  adapted  to the  market  volume  requirements,  on  average.  Moreover,  we verify that  
the   sales   are   characterized   by   a   stronger   variability   as   regards   to   the   supply.   In 
particular,  the  market  reacts  to the supply  one or to vintage  years  later. For example, let  
us  consider  the  scarce  vintage  years  (1984  or  2001).  In  spite  of  a  following  raising  
production,  the  sailes  continue  to decrease  (1985- 1989  or 2002- 2004). This means  that, 
i) the  level of competition  on  the  market  is quite  high  and  a small  supply  variation  is 
able  to  affect  it negatively  and  ii) it is difficult  and  costly  to  get  back  the  lost  market  
shares.  An exception  is the fast  sailes’ increase  in 1994- 1995. 
1983 378.469 760.502 70,7899
1984 248.015 747.208 391.763 67,0207
1985 268.612 590.261 404.962 91,0359
1986 297.715 531.566 327.307 107,4214
1987 323.378 517.614 311.667 121,1812
1988 301.499 545.411 295.581 135,5170
1989 302.190 573.494 273.416 164,5425
1990 290.751 595.744 279.940 147,2885
1991 246.518 646.558 239.937 152,7426
1992 279.245 607.189 285.887 114,8912
1993 247.838 621.924 264.510 72,0553
1994 285.669 553.820 315.942 86,2051
1995 275.945 485.078 354.411 192,4254
1996 281.139 474.244 286.779 284,8169
1997 268.592 481.370 274.013 299,5337
1998 296.310 491.419 258.543 341,9933
1999 300.976 525.534 262.195 277,3527
2000 291.406 559.184 267.326 258,6235
2001 263.153 556.871 293.719 388,0414
2002 269.252 541.450 286.215 410,5910
2003 241.619 558.332 252.370 277,3720
2004 270.852 580.000 219.951 210,0000
Intermediate 
price (€)
Vintage Year Production (hl) Stock (hl) Sales (hl)
11Table 1: production, stock  and sales  of the DOCG Chianti Classico  (1983- 2004). 
Source: Consorzio  di Tutela  Chianti Classico.
The demand  – supply  variability affects  the stocks’ tren ds. In particular, the stabilization  
of  the  commercialized  quantity  (i.e.  the  adaptation  of  the  supply  to  the  demand)  is 
regulated  through   the  stocks’  management.   Thus,  an   increase  in  the  stocks   can  be 
interpreted  as a decrease  of the consumption  relatively to the supply. On the other  hand,  
in the  period  characterized  by scarsity,  the  utilization  of the  stocks  can  help  to  meet  
market   volume   requirements   and   avoid   the   supply   uncertainty   problem.   Thus,   the 
stocks’ management  is aimend  at stabilizing  the demand  – supply  ratio, in order  to avoid 
a  strong  variability  of  prices  and  assure  the  producers’  remuneration  of  the  quality  
effort  up- stream    and  ii)  stabilize  the  quality  level  of  the  commercialized  quantity, 
expecially in vintage  years, which are characterized  by a low level of quality.
Let us  now  analyze  the  intermediate  price  trend  from  1984  to 2004  and  consider  i) the 
price variability (from  one year to another  as well as within  the same  year) relatively to i) 
the  demand-  supply  variability  and  ii)  the  production  costs,  i.e.  the  producer  quality 
effort.  At first,  the  intermediate  price  trend  reflects  the  demand  – supply  variability 
(Fig.3).  In particular,  it reacts  to the  scarcity/surplus  situations  with  a lag of one or two  
years.  The  demand  – supply  variability  affects  the  intermediate  price  also  within  the 












































































































Stocks (hl) Intermediate Price (constant €)
Fig. 3: stock  and intermediate  price trend (1983- 2004). Source: Consorzio  di Tutela  
Chianti Classico.
4 Let us analyze  the intermediate  monthly  prices  of the Chianti Classico DOCG. We verify 
that  the  difference  between  the  minimum  and  the  maximum  monthly  price  averages  54 
€. Moreover, the  greatest  intra- annual  variability corresponds  to the  periods  1992- 1996  
and  1999- 2001, thus  to the periods  characterized  by a strong  scarcity or surplus  and, in 
general, by a strong  market  unbalance. 
12Let us  compare  the  intermediate  price  and  production  cost  trend  (from  1995  to  2003). 
At first, the  intermediate  price do not  always  cover  the  costs  of quality 5 (for example,  in 
2003  the  cost  is about  83 €/hl  higher  than  the  grower  price). Following  Shapiro  (1983), 
the  absence  of a premium  price  implies  a risk  of breaking  in the  wine  reputation  and  
typicity  in the  long  term.  The  risk  is that  the  quality  policy  is not  recognized  by the  
intermediate  market,  i.e. the production  costs, associated  to the quality wine production  
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Fig. 4: The production  cost and the intermediate  price for an hectoliter of wine  
(1995- 2003). Source: Consorzio  Chianti Classico.
Nevertheless,  the  long  term  analysis  shows  that  on  average  the  intermediate  price  is 
higher  than  the production  cost . The existence  of a premium  price, which  is not  justified  
by the  production  cost  points  out  other  problem:  the  Appellation  of Origin  can  be not  
able to resolve  the  asymmetric  information  problem  (Laporte,  2001). Following  Shapiro, 
the  premium  price  is justified  by the  necessity  to  maintain  the  collective  reputation  in 
the long term.  The firms  which develop  an Appellation  of Origin strategy  benefits  from  a 
“scarcity   profit”,   which   results   from   the   quantity   delimitation   of   the   production  
(Laporte,   2001).  Laporte   (2001)   shows   that   the   stable   existence   of   a   quality 
differentiation   within   the   same   Appellation   of   Origin   cannot   result   from   the   free 
competition  among  producers.  Thus,  it can  exist  only if some  producers  benefit  from  a 
competitive  advantage  as  regards  to  the  others.  At these  conditions,  the  price  can  be 
higher   than   the   production   cost.   Thus,   Laporte   raises   the   question   whether   the 
Appellation  of  Origin  can  resolve  or  not  the  problem  of  the  asymmetric  information  
among  producers.  
5 The  production  costs  are  mainly  determined  by the  quality  policy. In 2003,  the  wine  
production  cost  represents  64 percent  of the total cost  of a bottle  of wine, while the cost  
to  bottle  and  commercialize  the  bottle  of  wine  represents  36%. The  grape  production  
cost  is the  most  important  cost, which  affects  the  total  wine production  cost  (82% from  
1995  to 2003). The relative effect  of the grape  production  cost  is a direct  consequence  of 
the   high   cost   for   the   development   of   the   quality   policy   (long   term   investments  
concerning  machines,  vineyards,  etc.).
13Finally,   the   intermediate   price   is   characterized   by   a   strong   intra- annual   variability 
(Figure  3).  The  fact  that  the  supply  is  constrained  (see  for  example,  the  delineated  
production  area,  the  specific  production  requirements  regarding  the  maximum  grape  
yields   par   hectare,   the   minimum   alcohol   content   and   other   quality   characteristics) 
strengthen  the  supply  and  the  demand  uncertainty  (Giraud- Héraud,  Soler  and  Tanguy, 
2000). In particular,  the  competition  among  industries  for the  grape  or wine supply  and  
the  risk  of a production’s  rationning  by the  vine grower  (together  with  the  opportunist  
behaviour  of some  agents)  incentive  the  industry  to  buy  (and  pay) more  than  the  real 
need  (and  more  than  what  is  really  feasible,  in  terms  of  financial  resources)  as  the 
market  in growing  or  positively  affected  by the  promotional  activity.  As a result,  the 
intermediate  prices  artificially increase.  As the  prices’ increase  arrive  to  the  end  of the  
supply  chain, it affects  the  retail prices  and  the  consumers  are probabily encouraged  to 
either  buy cheaper  table  wine or switch  beverages.  Thus,  the  demand’s  decrease  implies  
a decrease  in prices, which  is strenghten  by the grape  growers’ fear  of accumulate  stock  
at the eve of a new vintage. 
Given  i) the  organizational  difficulties,  the  strong  variability of intermediate  prices, thus  
the  risk  of  breaking  the  collective  reputation  and  ii)  the  recent  situation  of  surplus,  
stock’s  accumulation  and  price  decrease  it  is  necessary  to  analyze  the  mechanisms  
implemented  by the  sectorial  organization  (Consorzio  di Tutela) in order  to  assure  an 
effective  economic  regulation  of  the  Appellation.  In the  next  section,  we  analyze  the  
mechanism,  which constitute  the Consorzio’s quality policy.
4.2.The   mechanisms   of   the   Appellation’s  quality   policy:   the 
quantity  and the quality  economic  regulation
Given the  supply  and  demand  uncertainty, thus  the low ex- post correlation  between   the 
volume  and  the  quality  of  the  vintage,  the  raising  competition  on  the  international  
markets   and   the   possible   losses   of   reputation   and   market   shares,   the   economic  
regulation  within  an  Appellation  is aimed  at  stabilizing  the  quantities  and  the  level of 
quality. Long term  mechanism  can be ex- ante  defined  (planting  rights,  regional  reserves  
as planting  rights’ markets,  ecc.), as well as short  term  mechanisms  (maximum  yield per  
hectare,  stock’s  management  to  compensate  for  the  scarcity/surplus  on  the  market,  
producers’   trade- off   among   vertical   differentiated   types   of   quality   wine,  i.e. 
DOCG/DOC/IGT. 
The  first  level of the  economic  regulation  of the  quantity  concerns  the  planted  area s. 
The   Common   Market   Organization   of   the   wine   sector 6  is   mainly   based   on  i)  the 
prohibition  of new vine planting  through  2010  (art.2), ii) the  premiums  granted  in return  
for the  permanent  abandonment  of vine- growing  on a particular  area  (art.8) and  iii) the 
allocation  of newly created  planting  rights  (art.6). Each planted  area  has  to be registred  
in the inventory  of production  potential  (art. 16), which  contains  i) the  areas  under  vines 
classified  as varieties  for the  production  of wine, ii) the  varieties  concerned,  iii) the  total 
stock  of existing  planting  rights.  The data  are  collected,  at a regional  level, filling  in of 
the  Community  vineyard  register 7, which  collects  the  following  information  concerning  
each  holding  where  vines  are grown: i)  its identity  and  situation,  ii) the  references  of the 
parcels  under  vines,  iii) its general  characteristics  and  iv) the  characteristics  of the  vines  
it   contains   and  the   products   produced   therefrom.   In  addition,   following  the   Italian  
legislation 8, each  planted  area,  which  is dedicated  to  the  production  of  Quality  wines  
must  be registred  in the  vineyards’ register  concerning  the  quality  wines  DOC/DOCG or 
the  IGT (typical geographical  indication) wines. The Common  Market  Organization  grant  
6 Council Regulation  (EC) No 1493/1999  of 17 May 1999  on the  common  organisation  of 
the market  in wine.
7  Council   Regulation   (EEC)  No   2392/86   of   24   July   1986   establishing   a   Community  
vineyard  register.
8 L. 10 february  1992  n.164.
14some  derogations  to  the  art.  2. In particular,  the  new  vine  planting  can  be  carried  out  
pursuant  to a planting  right  granted  from  a reserve. In fact, Member  States  shall create  a 
national  reserve,  and/or  as  the  case  may  be,  regional  reserves,  of  planting  rights,  in 
order  to improve  the  management  of production  potential, at a national  and/or  regional  
level (art.5). In this  context,  the  Tuscany  Region  has  established  a specific regulation  of 
the quality wines’ production.  The Chianti Classico  registred  planted  area  averages  7.000  
hectares  from  1990  to  2003  and  has  a quite  increasing  trend,  expecially  from  1998  to 
2003. 
A second  level  of  the  economic  regulation  of  the  quantity  and  quality  concerns  the 
specific  production  requirements.  The  geographical  area  of Chianti  is delimited  by the  
interministerial  decree  31  july  1932.  The  term  «Chianti  Classico»  represents  only  the  
most  ancient  production  area  of  the  Chianti.  The  Chianti’s  first  production  code  is 
defined  in  1967.  In 1984  the  Chianti  is  recognized  as  a DOCG. Following  the  Italian  
quality wines’ law (see note  8) the ministerial decree  5 august  1996  establishes  a specific 
production  code  for the Chianti  Classico  DOCG, which  has  been  then  modified  (the most  
recent   production   code   is   that   of   september   2005).   It   must   be   recognized   to   the  
Consorzio  di  Tutela  the  ability  to  maintain  in  the  long  term  the  specific  production  
requirements  concerning  the  ampelographical  composition,  the  maximum  grape  yields  
per  hectare  and  other  quality  characteristics  (the  maximum  yield  of wine  from  grapes, 
the  minimum  density  of rootstocks  per  hectare,  the  minimum  natural  alcohol  level by 
volume,  the  minimum  total  acidity,  etc)9. These   constraining  rules,  together  with  the 
delimited  production  area  and  the  strong  link with  the  terroir, have allowed  to  i) reduce  
the  informational  asymmetries  between  producers  and  consumers  and  ii) strengthen  the 
horizontal  differentiation  between  the  Chianti  Classico  and  the  other  DOC/DOCG wines, 
i.e. the wine typicity and  the quality signal expressed  by the collective brand.  
Nevertheless,  the  production  code  provides  a  certain  level  of  flexibility,  in  terms  of 
quantity  constraints 10 and  producers  market  strategies.  The  producer  of the  grapes  or 
wine  can  renounce  the  right  to  the  Classico  specification.  Given  some  well  defined  
conditions,  the  producer  has  different  possibilities  concerning  its brand  positionning  on 
the  market.  Following  the  Italian  wine  Law, a  producer  can  choose  among  different  
quality  levels,  coexistent  in the  same  production  area  (the  DOCG Chianti  Classico,  the  
DOCG Chianti  and  also  the  DOC «Colli dell’Etruria  Centrale» or the  IGT Tuscany). That’s 
why  the  Chianti  Classico  declared  area  (which  corresponds  to  the  declaration  of  the 
grape  and  wine production) is about  the 88% relatively to the registred  planted  area. The 
continuous   trade- off   between   the   Designation   of   Origin   and   the   brand,   thus   the 
flexibility to produce  and  sell outside  the  Designation  of Origin  (as well as the  existence  
of potential  entrants)  is one of the element,  which reduce  the possible  negative effects  of 
a supply’s control  in this sector.
A  third   level   of   the   economic   regulation   of   the   quantity   and  quality   concerns   the 
functions  of  the  sectorial  organization  (Consorzio  di Tutela). Following  the  Italian  law 
2/10/92,  no.  164,  the  Consorzio  di Tutela    is a voluntary  sectorial  organization,  with 
functions  of protection  and  valorization  of the  DOC/DOCG or IGT wines.  In particular, 
the  Consorzio has  to assure  i) the respect  of the specific production  requirements  and  ii) 
the  protection  of the  quality  wine  from  plagiarism  or  unfair  competition  and  has  the  
important  function  of  valorization  through  promotional  activities.  In addition,  if  the 
9 All the  operations  (vinification, preservation,  bottling  or bottle  fining  and  aging ) must  
be carried  out  within  the  delimited  production  zone.  The  Chianti  Classico  wine  can  be 
issued  for consumption  no sooner  than  October  1 of the  year following  the harvest.  The 
production  code  defines  also  some  rules  concerning  the  labelling  (the year  in which  the 
grapes  were  produced  must  appear  on  the  bottles  or  other  containers  in  which  the  
Chianti Classico wine is issued  for consumption)  and  the packaging. 
10 Whenever  the  yield  of wine  from  grapes  exceeds  the  maximum  level, but  by no  more  
than  75%, only  the  excess  has  no  right  to  the  DOCG. Beyond  that  percentage,  all the  
output  loses  the right  to the DOCG.
15Consorzio i) represents  at  least  40  percent  of the  Appellation’s  production  and  surface  
and  ii) has  an  interprofessional  composition,  the  Minister  can  grant  it the  function  of 
vigilance   (relatively   to   its   members)   concerning   the   quality   wines’   law   application.  
Moreover,   the   production   code  of   Chianti   Classico   recognizes  to   the  Consorzio  the 
possibility  to regulate  the  maximum  grape  yield  per  hectare.  In particular,  is it possible 
to  define  (each  year, before  the  vintage) a more  constraining  maximum  grape  yield  per 
hectare,   in   order   to   improve   the   vintage’s   quality.   For  example,   the   Consorzio   has  
decided   to   reduce   by   20%  the   maximum   yield   per   hectare   in   the   vintage   2004   to 
adequate  the supply  to the market  volume  requirements.  
Let us  now  consider  the  Consorzio  quality  policy. An important  element  is given  by the  
ability (and  possibility) to provide  a clear an effective quality image. The Chianti Classico 
DOCG is distinguished  into  Chianti  Classico  «vintage» and  «Riserva» 11. Thus, the  vertical 
product  differentiation  within  the  Appellation  is  quite  clear.  In both  cases,  the  most  
representative   price’s   segment   in   terms   of   volume   (<5€   and   <7€   respectively)   is 
characterized  by a moderate  level of competition  (in terms  of number  of firms).  As a 
result,  the  Appellation  can maintain  in the  long  term  a quite  wide  product  range,  such  
that  the  heterogeneity  of  consumers’  preferences  can  be  fulfilled.  A sample  of  312 
representative   companies   have   210   brands   (121   Chianti   Classico   «vintage»   and   89 
«Riserva»), within  the  Appellation  (less  than  one  brand  for  each  company).  Thus,  the  
quality  signal  is  clear  and  varied  at  the  same  time.  Moreover,  the  Consorzio  Chianti 
Classico  and  the  Consorzio  «Black  Rooster»  have  recently  merged,  in order  to  increase  
the  horizontal  differentiation  relatively  to  the  other  Appellations,  i.e.  strengthen  the 
typicity, the quality policy and  the link with the terroir and  provide  a clear quality signal. 
Another  important  element  is  the  promotional  activity. The  promotion  is  one  of  the  
most  important  activities  of  the  sectorial  organization  (Consorzio  di Tutela). From  an 
economic   point   of   view,   the   promotional   cost   distribution   among   the   sectorial  
organization’s   members   justify   the   collective   brand   creation   (Beales  et   alii,  1981). 
Moreover,  the  promotional  activity  is aimed  at  reducing  the  informational  asymmetries  
between  producers  and  consumers.  The promotional  activity  of the  Consorzio currently 
represents  the  2% of   the   total  production’s   value   (i.e.  635.000  euros).  In  2003,  the 
advertising   concerning   the   domestic   market   represents   the   57   percent   of   the   total 
advertising’s cost.
In order  to  stregthen  the  minimum  quality  standard  of the  Appellation,  the  Consorzio 
has  been  recognized  a  specific  role  of  the  Consorzio  in  the  certification  of  quality. 
Following the ministerial  decree  29 may 2001, if the  Consorzio represents  at least  66% of 
the  Appellation’s   production,   the   Minister   can   recognize   it   the   function   of   control, 
concerning  all the  supply  chain  stages  from  the  grape  production  to  the  bottled  wine 
commercialization,  in order  to grant  the  complete  traceability  and  of the  wine. Thus,  in 
Italy the  functions  of certification/control  and  valorization  are  recognized  to  the  same  
institution.   In   the   grapeproduction   stage,   the  Consorzio  controls   the   vineyard  
registration  in the  specific Appellation  register  and  the  grape  production  declaration,  in 
particular,  the  respect  of the  maximum  grape  yield per  hectare.  Moreover, the  Consorzio 
verifies,  with  an  inspection  control,  the  registred  surface,  the  respect  of  the  specific 
production  requirements  (quality characteristics) and  the maximum  yield per  hectare.  At 
the  end  of this  first  stage, the  Corsorzio gives to the  Chamber  of Commerce  a receipt  of 
the  production’s  declaration  and  the  relative  conformity  advice  for  the  certification  of 
the   grapes   or   of   the   wine,   which  could  be   recognize   as   Chianti   Classico.   In   the 
vinification  stage,  the  Consorzio  controls  the  vinified  quantities,  the  purchased/sold  
quantities  and  the  stocked  quantity.  Thus,  the  Consorzio  collects  all  the  information  
concerning  the  product  flows  along  the  supply  chain,  for  each  economic  agent.  It also 
provides  a sample  control  concerning  the  chemical- physical  and  sensory  analyses  and  
11 The Chianti  Classico  «Riserva» can be released  for consumption  only after  it has  been  
subjected  to at least  24 months  of aging  and  bottle  fining  of at least  3 months.  And  it 
must  develop  a minimum  total alcohol  level of at least  12.5%.
16gives  to  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  the  conformity  advice  for  the  certification  of the  
wine  as Chianti  Classico  DOCG. In the  last  stage  of bottling,  the  Consorzio controls  the 
quantities  to bottle  and  provides  a sample  control  to verify the correspondence  between  
the  certification  of quality  given  by the  Chamber  of Commerce  and  the  wine  to  bottle.  
Finally, the  Consorzio distribute  the  official identification  marks.  The ministerial  decree  
21  march  2002  defines  the  costs’ range  of the  control  activity  for  each  phase:  i) 0.21-
1.55  €/q  (vine growth),  ii) 0.30- 2.20  €/hl  (vinification),  iii) 0.30- 2.20  €/hl  (bottling). The 
preliminary   results   of   the   control   activity   are   quite   positive   and   show   that   the  
Appellation   provides   an   effective   minimum   quality   standard   to   the   consumers 12. 
Actually,  28  organizations  (and  68  Appellations)  have  been  authorized  to  the  control  
activity. 
Although  the Consorzio has  been  recognized  as the institution  providing  the certification  
and  the  control  of  the  Appellation,  it  is  quite  limited  in  the  possibilities  to  define  
interprofessional   agreements   to   regulate   the   quantities   and   prices   on   the   the  
intermediate  market.  For example,  as the  intermediate  market  represent  only 20- 25% of 
the  total  wine   transactions,   the  Consorzio  should  be  interesting  in  proposing  some  
mechanisms  of price regulation  (reference  price, minimum  price, etc.).
5. Conclusion
The analysis  of the current  situation  concerning  the DOCG Chianti Classico  has  provided  
the  following  elelements.  In a context  of demand  and  supply  uncertainty,  it is necessary  
to  give to  the  sectorial  organization  the  possibility  to  regulate  the  supply,  in terms  of 
quantity  and  quality,  in order  to  stabilize  the  producers’  remuneration  for  the  quality  
effort.  Otherwise,  the  risk  is that  of a decrease  in quality  investments  and  decrease  in 
the  collective  reputation  in  the  long  term.  At  first,  it  is  necessary  to  develop  some  
mechanisms  to regulate  the  intermediate  price (for example, reference  prices). Secondly, 
it is necessary  to  develop  long  term  agreements  between  vine  growers  and  industries.  
These   regulation   mechanisms   are   aimend   at   stabilizing   the   remuneration   of   vine 
growers  and, on the other  hand,  the purchase  cost  for the buyers, thus  they facilitate  the  
development   of   quality   investments   up- stream   and   marketing   investments   down-
stream.  
Moreover,   the   quality   policy   (certification   of   quality   and   monitoring)   is   aimed   at 
strengthening  the  minimum  quality  standard,  thus  the  homogeneity  of the  production’s 
systems  (in terms  of specific production  requirements  and  quality characteristics) within  
the   same   Appellations,   in   order   to  i)  increase   the   differentiation   among   different  
Appellations   and  ii)  give   an   effective   and   clear   quality   signal   to   the   consumers.  
Nevertheless,  it is also  important  to  define  a level of minimum  quality  standard,  such  
that  the  investments  in  brand’s  strategies  are  incentivated  and  the  internal  product  
range  of the Designation  of Origin is preserved.   
In addition,   it  is  necessery  to  develop  a strong  promotional  activity  of  the  collective 
brand,   in   order   to   reduce   the   informational   asymmetries   between   producers   and  
consumers,  in particular  the information  research  cost, and  strengthen  the quality signal 
of the Designation.  
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